2 The terms "management buyout" and "buyout" will be used interchangeably in this paper. The sample of firms included in this study were all targets of a group which included incumbent managers and offered to purchase all of the outstanding equity (or equity not already owned by members of that group). All of the offers called for the elimination of publicly traded equity upon completion of the offer. No divisional buyouts are included in this study. The sample includes both firms that were successfully taken private by management and firms which received buyout offers but were acquired by another party.
3 Kaplan (1989b) , for example, reports an average premium of 42.3%. 4 See, however, Long and Ravenschraft (1989) for a critical analysis of these and other LBO performance studies.
(1) Outside Board members: The directors of an MBO target are required to project the interests of existing stockholders. In the face of attempted underbidding, outside directors can take three steps to protect public stockholders' interests. First, the directors can act as bargaining agents for outside shareholders. Second the directors can recommend that shareholders vote against a buyout proposal or refrain from tendering their shares. Third, directors can actively seek rival bidders.7 Nevertheless in several cases, the Delaware courts found that several boards failed to act independently in management buyouts. A key factor in the court's opinions is the boards' failure to actively pursue competing offers.8
(2) Shareholders' access to legal recourse: Outside shareholders can seek legal protection from inadequate bids. During the period examined in this study shareholders could file litigation on three bases. First, they could attempt to prevent the transaction from occurring on the grounds that it lacks a "proper business purpose." Second, shareholders could seek appraisal remedies in the courts as a device to force buyout participants to pay higher prices.9 Third, shareholders could allege that the MBO involves conflicts of interest without arms-length negotiation.
(3) Competition for control: Both actual and potential competing offers could limit the ability of managers to underbid. An important determinant of the success of competition in preventing managerial underbidding is the ownership structure of the firm. Large inside holdings might effectively prevent outsiders from competing against the buyout group's bids.'0 On the other hand, a high degree of concentration of outside ownership may increase the likelihood of potential or actual outside bids. Large outside shareholders might represent potential allies for an outside bidder competing with managers.
5See, e.g., Hite and Vetsuypens (1989) for an analysis of some of these issues in the context of divisional buyouts. 6The opportunity to block most buyout offers by voting against the proposal (or by not tendering shares) provides public shareholders direct control over management abuse (DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice (1984) ). This study abstracts from this issue, examining only non-voting controls over MBOs.
7For a detailed discussion of the role and responsibility of the Board of Directors in the current legal environment see Simpson (1988 This section studies the association of outsider attempts at control with pre-buyout stockholder abnormal returns. Table 1 characterizes the types and incidence of takeover activity experienced by firms in the sample. The 83 firms that were not the targets of any outside takeover activity are called the non-takeover sample. The 101 firms that were the targets of other takeover activity are called the takeover sample.
Takeover activity in the takeover sample includes:
(1) Unsuccessful outside offers, targeted share repurchases from a large stakeholder, and published rumors that the firm was the target of takeover activity prior to the announcement of the management buyout offer. (2) An announcement of a large stake acquisition by an outsider prior to the announcement of the buyout proposal, an intention to acquire, or an impending proxy fight.
11 For a discussion of the meaning of the cumulative abnormal return and event study methodology, see DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice (1984) . 12 In most cases, the accumulation period's ending date was the date of shareholders' approval of the going private proposal, or the announcement date of the results of a successful bid or tender offer. If the Wall Street Journal did not provide a satisfactory announcement date, the ending date was the last trading day of the firm's common stock. Board approval was never used as the ending date because in some of the buyouts outside bids or bid revisions occurred after board approval. The market model estimates are calculated over the 400 trading days before the start of the accumulation period. 13 All statistical tests of stock returns used standardized CARs. Thus competition can involve explicit competing bids (categories (3) and (4) above) or other takeover activity (as described in categories (1) and (2)). Table 1 shows that 71 of the 184 buyout proposals (39%) faced explicit competition. Of the remaining 113 firms, 16% (30 firms) experienced other forms of competitive takeover activity but did not receive a formal outside offer. We describe these firms as facing implicit competition. Finally, 45% (83 firms) of the entire sample experienced neither explicit nor implicit competition around the time of the buyout proposal. Table 2 provides average cumulative abnormal returns for firms stratified by the presence and type of competition accompanying the buyout offers. The mean cumulative abnormal returns for each group in the sample range from 25.9% to 43.7%. All means are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
Panel A of table 2 compares the 83 nontakeover offers with the 101 takeover offers. The t-test rejects the hypothesis that the mean returns to pre-buyout shareholders are equal for the takeover and non-takeover samples. The Wilcoxon two-sample test rejects the hypothesis of equality of the two the distributions. Panel A shows that stockholders achieve higher abnormal returns from buyouts with explicit competing bids and/or implicit outside competition. Panel B rejects the hypothesis that the means and the distributions of the cumulative abnormal returns for the single bidder (that is the buyout offer alone) versus the multiple bidder (the buyout offer plus at least one outside bidder) samples are equal. Panel C stratifies the sample into the 83 firms facing no outside competition and the 30 firms facing implicit competition. There is no significant difference in mean or median abnormal returns to stockholders in these two groups.
In summary, the table documents an association between competition via explicit outside bids and higher abnormal returns to stockholders. In contrast, implicit outside competition is not associated with higher abnormal returns compared to the returns experienced by stockholders of buyouts involving no competition whatsoever.
This difference between stockholder's abnormal returns in MBOs subject to explicit outside competition versus those subject to implicit outside competition is verified in panel D of the table. The panel compares abnormal returns for the group of buyouts subject to explicit competition with those subject to implicit competition alone. The data shows that the mean and median abnormal return to the former group are significantly greater than the mean and median return to the latter group.
14 Classification into these categories is based on the last type of takeover activity to occur other than the buyout announcement. The activity had to have taken place within a year of the buyout announcement.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
These results imply that the higher returns to the takeover sample can be explained by the 71 multiple bid contests, rather than takeover activity per se.15"16 At this point there are two possible explanations for the above empirical regularities. First, competing bids could limit management's ability to pay prices unfavorable to the pre-buyout stockholders. Second, the total gains arising from a buyout might determine the degree of explicit bidding competition. That is, competing bids are more likely to occur when the potential gains from a buyout are high. This induces a positive association between the existence of competing bids and abnormal returns to pre-buyout stockholders.
In short, the direction of causality is not clear. The essential question is does competitive bidding result in higher returns to pre-buyout shareholders because it increases the share of the total gains to thee stockholders, or is it simply that high potential gains are associated with explicit competition.'7 The following analysis considers this issue.
B. The Impact of Pre-and Post-MBO Controls on Stockholder Returns
This section examines the role of pre-MBO activity, as well as post-MBO activity to control management buyouts. The issue raised here is important in that it provides information on the effectiveness of outside stockholders' attempts to protect themselves from adverse managerial decisions. The sample of 184 MBOs is divided into groups on the basis of the type and timing of takeover activity (pre-MBO hostile bids, post-MBO competing bids, implicit takeover activity), internal controls (post-MBO negotiation and shareholder litigation), and no other activity. Table 3 presents a three-by-three contingency table that permits the simultaneous evaluation of the association of these factors with returns earned by pre-buyout shareholders. The rows of table 3 describe events preceding the announcement date of the buyout group's offer. These rows partition the firms into three categories of takeover activity. The first row contains the 114 firms that experienced no takeover activity prior to the MBO bid. The second row contains the 45 firms that experienced some form of implicit takeover activity prior to the MBO. This classification includes failed takeover bids, rumors of pending outside bids, large stake acquisitions or other events described in categories (1) and (2) 16 The apparent differences in returns could be the consequence of including 35 management buyout proposals that lost to competing bidders. In order to check this, table 4 was reproduced using only the 149 successful buyout proposals. The results are virtually identical to those in table 4 using the full sample. Furthermore, in November, 1985 the Delaware courts mandated active participation by outside directors in obtaining competitive bids. This may have altered the relative returns received by stockholders of targets after this decision. In order to check this, table 4 was constructed for pre-and post November, 1985 proposals. The incidence of competition increased after the Revlon decision. However, there was no substantial difference in the return comparisons over these two time periods.
17The authors are indebted to an anonymous referee for pointing out the dual interpretation. 18 The third column of table 3 includes 22 firms that negotiated bids upwards or were objects of shareholder lawsuits and received a competing outside offer after the initial buyout offer. This classification scheme seems reasonable in light of the results in table 2. In all but one of these 22 cases, the litigation or efforts to raise the bid preceded the arrival of the competing offer. returns to pre-buyout public shareholders differ according to the type of pre-and post-buyout activity.
Notice that on average, returns on firms experiencing some form of explicit pre-or post-MBO bidding (hostile or competing bids) contain larger cumulative abnormal returns than those experiencing no explicit bidding competition (row 3 and column 3 versus all other rows and columns). Furthermore, the largest returns are received by stockholders in buyouts in which there were bids prior to or bids following the buyout announcement, but were accompanied by no other takeover activity. Finally, buyouts that experienced no control on managerial behavior (no activity pre-and most-MBO) have the lowest average cumulative abnormal returns. Table 4 11, 12, 21, or 22 versus 13,  32, 31, 32, or 33) . Of the 20 comparisons, 14 indicate that the firms experiencing no explicit competition have significantly lower abnormal returns than those experiencing either pre-or post-MBO competition. The 6 comparisons revealing no significant difference in abnormal return all involve either hostile bids followed by negotiation or shareholder litigation (cell 32) or implicit takeover activity followed by competing bids (cell 23). The findings in tables 3 and 4 are amenable to a straightforward interpretation. Row and column comparisons indicate that firms experiencing pre-and/or post-MBO bidding earn significantly higher returns compared to firms experiencing other forms of control mechanisms. Furthermore, firms experiencing no control activity other than the buyout offer (cell 11) had the lowest abnormal returns compared to all other groupings.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
Further examination of tables 3 and 4 provide additional insight into the direction of causality. Those MBOs experiencing neither explicit nor implicit competition (cell 11) experienced the lowest average abnormal return of all cells. These cell returns, in general, are significantly lower than those containing some explicit bidding competition, but not significantly lower than cell returns containing non-bidding forms of competition. These results provide evidence that MBO offers are, in general, not preemptive, and that non-bidding attempts at control are ineffective in improving returns to stockholders over no control activity. "
Those MBOs experiencing only pre-or postannouncement bidding, (cells 13 and 31) had the two highest abnormal returns. These returns are significantly greater than both the returns in the absence of any control activity, and those when non-bidding activity was present. This implies that the alternative control mechanisms are not successful in providing additional time for potential bidders to contest the management offer or to induce higher bids from the buyout group. Indeed it appears that competing bids alone suffice to raise shareholders' value.
C. The Impact of Alternative Control Mechanisms on MBO Bidding
The above analysis provides substantial information on the impact of competition and alternative control mechanisms on pre-offer stockholder abnormal returns. This section examines the impact of these alternative mechanisms on offer revisions following the initial buyout offer. The analysis throws additional light on the effectiveness of these mechanisms in controlling underbidding. Three common control mechanisms are considered. These are: (1) outside directors as agents for stockholders, (2) stockholder litigation, and (3) competing outside bids.
Within the total sample, the WSJ reported that 109 firms experienced buyout bid revisions after an initial offer. Twenty-six of these revisions fol-19 See Fishman (1988) for a model of preemptive bidding under conditions of asymmetric information. In that model Fishman shows that bids designed to foreclose on the arrival of competing bids result in higher returns to targets than initial bids that lead to competing bids. a Revisions are calculated as the revised offer price minus the initial offer price divided by the initial offer price.
Revisions for the two firms (one in each row) who initiated offers prior to the 1987 market break, changed their bids immediately following the break, and then changed again following negotiation or lawsuits, are computed using the first post crash price as the initial price.
bRevisions are calculated as the ending offer price minus the buyout group's first offer price divided by its first offer. Outside offers prior to the buyout group's first offer are ignored. The revision for one of the two firms whose bidding contest spanned the 1987 market break is computed using the first post crash price as the initial price. No revision figure is reported for the other firm because the crash occurred just prior to the last bid. lowed recommendations of outside directors.20'2' Twenty-seven revisions followed shareholder litigation, and 56 followed explicit competing bids. Table 5 reports summary statistics for these revi-22 mda ent sions. The median and mean revisions due to negotiation are about 8%. In these cases, revisions range from less than 1% up to 33%. The median and mean revisions due to shareholder litigation are 5% and 7%, respectively. The results reported in the first two rows of table 5 demonstrate that bargaining by outside directors and shareholder litigation provide some protection against underbidding by the buyout group. However, the revisions in many of these cases are small. In fact, 6 of the 53 revisions are less than 1% and can be regarded as token revisions.23
The third row of table 5 presents revisions following competing bids. The median and mean revisions relative to the buyout group's first offer are about 13% and 17%, respectively. These figures are roughly twice the comparable values for revisions following non-bidding controls on buyout offers. Furthermore, none of the revisions in the contested bids are less than 2%. The average revision due to competing bids is significantly different from the average revisions due to negotiation and litigation at the 1% level.24
The relative magnitudes of the revisions suggest that direct competition has a greater impact on buyout offer revisions than the other control mechanisms. This implies that competing bids are effective in improving on initial buyout offers, whereas other forms of control are less effective. This is direct evidence that explicit competition contributes to higher returns to stockholders compared with other forms of control. It is also inconsistent with the argument that high potential gains attract competition rather than vice versa. The other control mechanisms should be no less effective in settings where the potential gains are large enough to attract competing bids.
IV. Ownership Structure and the Incidence of Competition
Up to this point the paper examines the role of alternative means of control over MBOs in improving the benefit to pre-buyout stockholders. The evidence suggests that stockholders of buyouts involving explicit controls over the buyout price, in general, fare well compared to those 20 Wall Street Journal information understates the incidence of this control because the initial announcement is occasionally coincident with board approval following negotiation with the board of directors. There is no reason to suspect that this problem biases our estimate of the average revision of the offer price due to the use of this control. 21 In 2 cases, the public announcement stated that the investment banker/advisor found the initial offer unfair. In 18 cases, the WSJ indicated that bargaining with outside directors and their advisors was the reason for the revision. In the remaining 6, the reason for revision was not specified. However, in each of these cases, other motivations for offer revision (litigation and competition) were absent. 22 Offers that included both cash and securities were valued using an investment banker's estimate of the securities' worth if the Wall Street Journal provided one. If not, then face value of the securities was used to compute the offer price. For this reason, results using offer prices may reflect some upward bias. The valuation of securities included in the offer was treated consistently for all three rows in table 3. stockholders of MBOs facing no controls. Furthermore, outside activity is more effective than internal mechanisms in exacting higher takeover bids. Finally, explicit competition from outside bidders is more effective than implicit outside competition. This section examines the impact of the firm's ownership structure on the incidence and effectiveness of competition for buyouts.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
Ownership structure includes both the concentration of holdings of large outside stockholders, as well as insider (manager) holdings. It is likely that the concentration and distribution of these holdings have an important impact on buyout bidding strategies and the returns to pre-buyout stockholders.
Large outside holdings may be an effective means of monitoring the terms of the buyout offer, thereby discouraging underbidding. On the other hand, the role of large outside stockholders as monitors of the firm's real operations could make buyouts less profitable. Finally, large outside stockholders could affect the intensity and form of outside takeover activity, thereby affecting the distribution of gains. The level of managerial holdings could also effect the distribution of gains arising from a buyout. In particular, large managerial holdings could serve to discourage outside competition, at the expense of the prebuyout stockholders. Table 6 presents the ownership structure of each sub-sample described in table 2. The second and third columns present the mean and median percentage total holdings of large stockholders in each subsample.25 The mean and median holdings of large outside shareholders range from 9% to 10% and from 5.1% to 6.9%, respectively. There are no significant differences in the mean or median across subsamples.
The fourth and fifth columns present the mean and median holdings of managers.26 These holdings range from 9.7% to 30.6% and from 5.2% to 29.5%, respectively. A pair-wise comparison of insider holdings for firms that faced competition and those that did not (panels A and B) reveals a significant difference in managerial ownership across these categories. Panel C and D demonstrate that low managerial holdings characterize buyout targets that face either implicit or explicit competition while buyouts that face no competition typically have large managerial holdings. Table 6 shows that the incidence of competition, either explicit or implicit, depends critically on the size of managerial holdings. Insider hold- 25 The holdings of large stockholders is defined as the sum of the holdings of all non-manager stockholders that own at least a 5% stake in the firm. The share ownership information was obtained from the proxy closest to the beginning of the accumulation period. 26 The managerial holdings figure reported here is the sum of all holdings by officers and directors. The figure reported also includes the holdings of family members and foundations controlled by managers. This total managerial holdings was utilized because it provides a reasonable assessment of managers' ability to block outside acquirers. ings are, on average, significantly higher when the firm's buyout faces little or no control of the offer, compared to the alternatives (panels A, B, and C). However, the level of managers' holdings does not influence the form of competition. Furthermore, the concentration of outside ownership is not associated with either the form or incidence of competitive behavior in buyout offers. Thus large insider holdings appear to deter explicit and implicit control activity accompanying an MBO, while outside ownership structure has little if any impact.
The ability of managers with a high level of ownership in the firm to deter control over the buyout may or may not affect the actual returns experienced by the pre-buyout stockholders. This question is studied directly by examining differences in the CARs of MBOs with a high degree of ownership concentration compared to those with a low degree of ownership concentration. In order to do this, the sample is divided into the 92 firms with the highest degree of manager ownership concentration versus the 92 with the lowest.27 The data indicate that, in,general, stockholders of MBOs with a high level of managerial holdings experience lower CARs than firms with low managerial holdings. However, after controlling for single Versus multiple bid contests, the level of managerial ownership has no significant impact on the average CARs. That is, a high degree of managerial holdings results in lower CARs to pre-buyout stockholders. However, this difference is explained by the lower incidence of explicit competition rather than the existence of large managerial holdings per se.
V. Conclusions
This study examines alternative mechanisms intended to control the price at which management buyouts are consummated. An examination of abnormal returns associated with management buyouts reveals that pre-buyout stockholders earn larger abnormal returns in contested buyouts compared to buyouts facing no competing or hostile bids. In contrast, buyouts accompanied by non-bidding forms of competition earn abnormal returns which are no greater than those facing no attempts to control management buyouts.
An examination of bid revisions accompanying buyouts reveals that revisions are significantly larger after explicit competitive bids are announced compared to those revisions associated with negotiations or shareholder litigation. Furthermore, large managerial holdings tend to reduce the incidence of explicit completion. This reduction in explicit competition reduces the overall return to pre-buyout stockholders. As a result, pre-buyout stockholders earn significantly lower abnormal returns when managerial holdings are large compared to the abnormal returns in buyouts where managerial holdings are small. The overall conclusion of this study is that explicit bidding competition in management buyouts leads to higher stockholder returns, higher offer revisions and may be an effective means of controlling buyout offer prices. In contrast, alternative control mechanisms, such as litigation, negotiation, and threat of competition has little effect on stockholder returns. Furthermore, stockholder returns in buyouts with this implicit competition fare no better than do stockholders of buyouts without any explicit or implicit competition.
